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Abstract | Over the past 10 years research and scholarship on secularity in general, and atheism in 
particular, has increased significantly. Moreover, these phenomena have been researched, studied and 
documented by multiple disciplines ranging from cognitive science to religious studies, and from an-
thropology to sociology. The study of atheism and secularity is of high interest to not only scholars, 
but also the public in general. In this special issue of Science, Religion & Culture, Guest Edited by John 
R. Shook, Ralph W. Hood Jr., and Thomas J. Coleman III, we present 8 articles, 2 research notes, and 
3 book reviews on the topics of atheism, secularity, and science. Each article is introduced with brief 
commentary drawing attention to some of the key theoretical and methodological issues surrounding 
them as well as their implications for the study of atheism and secularity.
Thomas J. Coleman III1, Ralph W. Hood Jr.1  and John R. Shook2 
1Department of Psychology, The University of Tennessee at Chattanooga; 2Philosophy Department, University at Buffalo, New 
York, USA.
An Introduction to Atheism, Secularity, and 
Science 
Research on atheism and secularity has become an attractive topic over the past decade. Search-
ing scholarly databases for scientific studies on these 
topics would have yielded little more than disap-
pointment at the turn of the millennium. However, 
conducting such a search today would reveal that a 
copious portion of ink has been split on secularity in 
general, and nonbelief specifically. Indeed, the scienc-
es no longer pass over what has become a sizable 
portion of the world’s population (Zuckerman and 
Shook, Forthcoming). 
Where it was once typical to begin a research article, 
introduction to a book volume, or special journal is-
sue such as this one, by the researcher lamenting their 
particular field of study for neglecting such topics, this 
kind of pleading is no longer tenable (Bullivant and 
Lee, 2012). Nonetheless, as researchers we cannot af-
ford to rest on our laurels for very long. While studies 
on atheism and secularity now exist across disciplines 
ranging from psychology, cognitive science, sociology, 
religious studies, philosophy, anthropology, and many 
others, this provides only a theoretical and methodo-
logical starting point from which to explore the given 
topic. Importantly, within each of these disciplines 
lay multiple competing frameworks, field-specific 
conceptualizations, and inter-disciplinary scuffles as 
to precisely what secularity is, and how to study it. 
Typically, pre-existing frameworks developed for use 
in religious believing populations are modified to fit 
nonbelievers, as nonbelief is often presumed to be the 
dark shadow of whatever belief or religiosity is (Cole-
man and Arrowood, 2015; Silver, Coleman, Hood, 
and Holcombe, 2014). How far this approach will go 
toward answering whatever questions the scholar is 
interested in is an open one. 
This special issue of the journal Science, Religion & 
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Culture (SRC) aimed to cast a wide net around athe-
ism, secularity, and science in effort to showcase a plu-
rality of approaches. While various authors define sec-
ularity and atheism in different ways. There is a cluster 
or family resemblance among the authors. Here we 
simply note that secularity is in some sense a denial of 
certain religious beliefs and practices while atheism is 
also in some sense a denial of specific theistic claims. 
However, the issue is somewhat clouded in that there 
is a sense in which every one is an atheist insofar as 
they deny a particular view of theism. Furthermore, 
under the umbrella of secularity are those who are 
simply nonbelievers, not even engaged enough with 
religious beliefs to deny them (Shook, 2012). One sel-
dom hears of astronomers spending much thought on 
denying astrological claims, nor do modern chemists 
seek to refute alchemical claims. Thus, we made no ef-
fort to impose any pre-determined definitions of such 
terms as secularity, atheism, or nonbelief in our call 
for papers for this special issue, though two papers 
deal at length with the question of definition.
In this special issue, we feature 8 articles, 2 research 
notes, and 3 book reviews from some of the top scholars 
in fields spanning psychology, sociology, and religious 
studies, as well as early career scholars who have now 
left their first mark. Each section in this introduction 
contains a brief prologue by the editors, introducing 
the subsections with 1-2 papers on a diverse number 
of topics including, scientific theory, discourse, psy-
chometrics, health and wellbeing, organized secular 
groups, secularity in academia, hypothetical god im-
age in nonbelievers, and deconversion, followed by the 
book reviews and a big thank you to the many reviewers 
who devoted their time to reviewing the submissions. 
In The Beginning: What is “nonreligion”? 
Right now, somewhere in the world a person is light-
ing a candle in a dark room. Why are they doing 
so? What is the nature of this occurrence? While 
this could certainly be the beginning of a ceremony 
to channel the ancestor spirits, it could just as eas-
ily be, what one does when the electricity goes out 
(Herrmann, Legare, Harris, and Whitehouse, 2013). 
Without knowing any more, is this scenario religious 
or nonreligious? However, for the purposes herein, we 
have little need to answer this question. The point is 
that it could easily be both. But nonetheless, to make 
such a distinction, between that of a religious or non-
religious act, we would certainly have to have much 
more context – whatever that might entail. In the end, 
the only way to know might be to ask the person, and 
even that has its limitations. 
As painfully ambiguous as the above example is, 
in that we may feel compelled to definitively know 
whether, how, or under what contexts, candle lighting 
can be religious or nonreligious, this same definitional 
ambiguity persists in the study of “nonreligion” and 
“nonbelief ” from both cognitive and religious stud-
ies perspectives. In the cognitive science of religion 
(CSR), where the research programme is to uncover 
the universal cognitive processes that facilitate the ac-
quisition of religious belief, these processes, much like 
the candle, remain “in the dark”. That is until one has 
further contextual clues with which to characterize the 
specific situation. Put another way, (and to pace “im-
plicit theism,” c.f., Uhlmann, Poehlman, and Bargh, 
2008) since the same processes that support belief 
also support nonbelief (Banerjee and Bloom, 2013; 
Coleman and Hood, 2015; Geertz, 2013; Geertz and 
Markusson, 2010; Gervais, Willard, Norenzayan, and 
Henrich, 2011; McCauley, 2011; Taves, 2013, 2015), 
attempts to characterize some cognition or behavior 
as primarily “religious” or “nonreligious” are doomed to 
fail in the long term. In this special issue of Science, Re-
ligion & Culture, we present two alternative, yet com-
plementary, articles that call into question the useful-
ness and necessity of defining atheism and nonreligion. 
On (not) defining (non)religion
In his article “On (not) defining (non)religion,” Jong 
draws on problematic definitional attempts in philos-
ophy, the social sciences, and even the natural sciences 
to suggest that definitions for “nonreligion,” like “reli-
gion,” are of, he suggests, “no legitimate scientific use” 
(15). However, he offers one possible strategy for pro-
gress in moving forward with research. By using the 
rapid advances made by CSR over the past two dec-
ades as a model (e.g., Atran and Norenzayan, 2004; 
Bering, 2006; Boyer and Lienard, 2006), Jong (22) 
suggests that definitions of religion and nonreligion:
…must come not at the beginning of a nascent 
research programme, but at the end. Or, bet-
ter yet, critical questions about how we use our 
terms should be asked over and over again, in 
light of new theories and evidence.
Given what we have said above, similar concerns ap-
ply to such terms as “nonbelief ” and “secularity.”
Discourse Analysis and the Definition of Atheism
In continuing the critique of necessary and suffi-
Science, Religion & Culture
June 2015 | Volume 2 | Issue 3 | Page 3                                                      
                              
Smith & Franklin
Academic Publishing Corporation
www.smithandfranklin.com
S ith  Franklin 
Academic Publishing Corporation 
www.smithandfranklin.com
cient definitions for phenomena, Quillen’s article 
“Discourse Analysis and the Definition of Atheism” 
makes an important contribution by tracking discur-
sive shifts that saw the historical “ἄθεος” become to-
day’s “atheism.” In this brief genealogical endeavor, he 
draws attention to how the term has been attached to 
various contexts and purposes ranging from theolog-
ical hegemony, rational-naturalism, and the scholarly 
pursuits of the social sciences. In the end, rather than 
looking to the Ivory Tower of academia to de-fuzz 
atheism as a category, perhaps we should value such 
definitional ambiguity and look to the very people 
who use the term atheism for its significance, or lack 
thereof. That is, we should take an emic approach to 
defining atheism and its cognates. As Quillen (32) 
suggests:
…‘Atheism’ might be equally seen as an empty 
signifier, so that rather than busying ourselves 
with definitions, and thus contributing to a dis-
course mired in ambiguity, our attentions can 
be turned toward how individuals who identify 
as ‘Atheists’ go about filling that signifier with 
what they perceive the word to mean for their 
own usage. 
In sum, both Jong’s and Quillen’s scholarship directs 
us to reconsider both precisely and broadly what non-
religion, nonbelief, atheism, nontheism, and so on and 
so forth - are, or are not. Much like the ambiguity 
of lighting a candle in the dark (under what condi-
tions might this be a religious act?), we will likely not 
have one enduring answer to any definitional quest, 
but only a collection of contexts in which a particu-
lar answer happens to provide meaning such that in 
this instance, lighting a candle is not a religious act. 
Measuring Nonbelief (And Belief!)
While definitions of nonreligious are one thing, survey 
measurement of the nonreligious is quite another. For 
example, let’s say you have just been invited to com-
plete a survey targeted at a nonreligious/nonbelieving 
demographic, of which you consider yourself to be a 
part. Happy to respond to this survey in order to share 
a little bit about yourself, you read the information 
and consent form on the first page and agree to par-
ticipate. After completing various demographic ques-
tions, you happen upon a section inviting you to an-
swer some questions about your (lack of ) religious or 
spiritual beliefs. The first question reads: “I believe in a 
God who watches over me” and you are asked to pro-
vide an answer to this ranging from strongly agree to 
strongly disagree1. How could you possibly answer this 
question without assenting to some level of precisely 
what it is you don’t have – belief in God? You couldn’t. 
The NonReligious-NonSpiritual Scale (NRNSS): 
Measuring Everyone from Atheists to Zionists
While nonbelief may no longer be a neglected topic in 
social scientific research in general (Bullivant and Lee, 
2012), neglect persists in several key areas. With the 
exception of a single example, scale measures that ap-
proach the atheist with the same level of beneficence 
shown the theist currently fail to exist. Therefore, we 
are pleased to introduce the publication of Cragun, 
Hammer, and Nielsen’s “The NonReligious-Non-
Spiritual Scale (NRNSS): Measuring Everyone from 
Atheists to Zionists.” Cragun, Hammer, and Neilsen 
(49) suggest:
…the present evidence suggests that the 
NRNSS is a psychometrically-sound measure 
of how religious (vs. nonreligious) and spiritual 
(vs. nonspiritual) individuals consider them-
selves to be, which can be validly adminis-
tered to individuals regardless of whether they 
self-identify as religious, spiritual, or neither. 
In their effort to take measuring individuals identify-
ing as “nonreligious” and “non spiritual” seriously, by 
providing a way to quantify religious identification 
and nonreligious identification without pointing “one-
and-a-half barreled” (Hill and Hood, 1999) questions 
at the nonreligious, Cragun and his colleagues usher 
in what we hope will be the first of many compar-
ative measures that do not exclude one of the fast-
est growing demographics on the planet: the nones. 
Daring Disbelief? Gambling With Your 
Health...
Belief is good for you! A long history of extensive re-
search on the relationship between religion and health 
is certainly evidence of this (c.f., Koenig, 2011). How-
ever, belief in what is good for you? That is the question. 
Surprisingly, or perhaps not, much of the research 
conducted in support of the “religion is good for you” 
hypothesis has never tested sources of meaning, val-
ues, and beliefs that do not contain religious content 
(Galen and Kloet, 2011). For example, research test-
ing secular sources of virtues such as altruism and hu-
mility, or positive emotions such as joy and happiness 
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remain missing for comparison with religious sources 
(Koenig, 2011). This lacuna in research often goes ig-
nored amidst the barrage of cross-sectional studies as-
sociating higher levels of religiosity with higher levels 
of well-being. Furthermore, and quite problematically, 
lower levels of belief in God are often taken to indicate 
that people with no belief must be suffering from poor 
mental and physical health. In the rush to demon-
strate that some aspects of religion may be beneficial 
for some religious people, nonreligious sources that 
nonbelievers might draw upon in reaping equivalent 
or even greater benefit from remain untested. 
In an article previously published in Science, Religion 
& Culture, titled “The Wager Renewed: Believing in 
God is Good for you,” McBrayer (2014) breathes new 
life into Pascal’s famous wager. In sum, Pascal’s origi-
nal wager proclaimed that it was better—that is, more 
pragmatic—to believe in God than not to believe. 
This is because, if God did exist, one’s belief (and con-
comitant good, if mildly abstinent behavior) would 
lead to eternal joy in Heaven at relatively little he-
donic cost; if one did not believe, however, one might 
allow oneself to indulge in worldly pleasures, but at 
the cost of one’s soul, which would be tormented eter-
nally; thus, in this scenario, believers “win” massively. 
If, on the other hand, God did not exist, there would 
neither be beatification for the faithful nor damnation 
for the heathen; here, the heathen “win,” for experi-
encing more pleasure in this life, but this win pales 
in comparison with the believers’ in the previous case. 
According to Pascal’s cost-benefit analysis, it is more 
prudent to bet on God. Presumably, however, Pas-
cal’s God is all-knowing, and being so, would be able 
to discern those who truly believed from those who 
were only gambling, and proceed to damn the latter 
for their insincerity. Where Pascal may have failed, 
McBrayer (2014, 130) aimed to mount a pragmat-
ic case for religious belief, based on worldly benefits 
rather than heavenly ones. He draws on the literature 
supporting a link between religion and health, and 
concludes that “most people have a strong reason to 
believe in God regardless of the evidence” due to the 
suggested benefits of believing. But does he succeed? 
Atheism, Wellbeing, and the Wager: Why Not Be-
lieving in God (With Others) is Good for You
McBrayer may have renewed the wager, but in this is-
sue, Galen ups the ante in his article “Atheism, Well-
being, and the Wager: Why Not Believing in God 
(With Others) is Good for You”. Here, Galen brings 
a critical analysis of McBrayer’s thesis, by drawing 
on additional research testing religious pro-sociali-
ty and the relationship between religion, health, and 
well-being (Galen, 2012, 2014, in press). It may not 
be so much what you believe in, but how you believe it 
and with whom, that is good for your health. As Galen 
suggests (63): 
…the evidence indicates that it is beneficial 
to have a coherent worldview and to engage 
in regular meaningful interactions with others 
who share this view in a supportive environ-
ment that allows for prosocial engagement with 
the broader community. There is no reason to 
suggest that any religious, spiritual, or supernat-
ural concepts need be invoked in order to facil-
itate this.
To return to the initial question, belief in what is good 
for you? Galen seems to have settled this question for 
now. In the end, it may not matter. Making a deal 
with the Devil, God, or even a piece of string cheese, 
can be good for you, provided that you really believe 
and believe it with others. 
From the U.S. to the U.K. - Secular Group 
Demographics 
One clear testament to the increase of the nonreli-
gious and nonbelievers around the world, specifically 
in the United States, has been the heightened visibility 
of Freethought groups. While most are familiar with 
at least one or two national groups, such as the Secu-
lar Student Alliance, Center for Inquiry, or American 
Atheists, not everyone is aware that countless other 
smaller groups exist throughout the nation at a local 
level. For example, in Chattanooga Tennessee, where 
co-editors Coleman and Hood reside, there are not 
only one, but two groups: the Chattanooga Free-
thought Association2 and the Chattanooga Humanist 
Assembly3. Here, the groups consist of not only local 
individuals, but also many people from other states. 
Some are members of both of these groups, while 
others may favor only one. Furthermore, there are 
individuals who may self-identify as freethinking or 
humanist, but belong to neither. Despite past assump-
tions that nonbelievers may constitute a unified group 
with shared goals and interests, like any other human 
being, religious or not, there are intra- and intergroup 
differences too (Baker and Robbins, 2012; Blank-
holm, 2014; Cotter, 2015; Fazzino, Borer, and Abdel 
Haq, 2015; LeDrew, 2015; Silver et al., 2014; Smith, 
2013). Nevertheless, numerous secular groups can be 
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found in all 50 states, but why do some join while 
others do not? How do these members approach the 
topic of religion in their day-to-day life? 
Atheism Looking In: On the Goals and Strategies of 
Organized Nonbelief
In their exploratory study secular groups titled “Athe-
ism Looking In: On the Goals and Strategies of Or-
ganized Nonbelief,” Langston, Hammer, and Cragun 
provide an in-depth look at the backbone of secular 
groups in the Unites States: their members. Drawing 
from a sample of 1,939 religious nonbelievers, they 
categorized individuals based on their level of group 
involvement (including its absence), explored the 
perceptions by secular group affiliates of those who 
remain nonaffiliated, probed for the best ways to ap-
proach religion and religious individuals, and asked 
their respondents several other important questions 
on related topics. In the end, there are many ways to 
“not believe,” and joining a group may only be one of 
them. As Langston, Hammer, and Cragun (83) sug-
gest regarding both the boon and the bane of attempts 
by secular groups to grow their numbers: 
Mobilizing nonbelievers for whom nonbelief is 
not salient will likely prove difficult, but it may also 
be the case that such nonbelievers represent the 
ultimate aim of the nonbelief movement – living 
one’s life comfortably without religious belief. 
Secular/nonbelief identity is multidimensional, mul-
tifaceted, nuanced, and diverse – no more or less so 
than a religious identity. Langston and colleagues’ 
study sheds light on the complex relationship be-
tween the individual atheist, the local Freethought 
group, national level groups, and society as a whole. 
A Profile of the Members of the British Humanist 
Association
Founded in 1896, the British Humanist Associ-
ation (BHA) has been advocating on behalf of the 
nonreligious for well over 100 years. Inquiry into the 
BHA demographics formed then PhD student Colin 
Campbell’s dissertation in 1967 and served as a snap-
shot of who Britain’s nonreligious were during that 
era. Between 1972 and 2006 his research had been cit-
ed only five times – testimony to the status of research 
into the nonreligious during that time. However, 
more recently there has been a revival, a nonreligious 
one of course. From 2006 and to 2011, Campbell’s 
work had received at least 86 citations (2014). Despite 
early neglect, Campbell’s (1971) monograph present-
ing his survey work of the BHA has now been cred-
ited as a significant and substantive contribution to 
sociological approaches to nonreligion (Bullivant and 
Lee, 2012). Unfortunately to date, and at this time 
of renewed interest in nonreligion, there has been no 
extensive follow up of BHA demographics published. 
Even with the renewed interest since 2006, Camp-
bell’s work has been at risk of further neglect; it has 
never been followed up – until now. 
In his research note, “A Profile of the Members of 
the British Humanist Association,” Longden builds 
on Campbell’s original research and provides a cross 
section of the BHA membership as of 2014. Tend-
ing to important demographic marker’s, such as sex, 
age, residence, employment, and level of education, 
Longden compares his current data (N = 1,097) with 
Campbell’s original 1967 data (N = 927). The impor-
tant question, have BHA demographics changed in its 
predominance of the younger, well educated male, ur-
banite membership of mid 20th century? As Longden 
(94) suggests: 
The 2014 survey has provided an insight into the 
membership of the BHA in the 21st century, the 
main conclusion is that, with the exception of 
age, the 21st century humanist is very much like 
their 20th century counterpart.
While the varying demographics of freethought 
groups can provide valuable insight into organized 
religious nonbelief, one should be careful not to take 
these as characterizations of religious nonbelief in total, 
as Longden suggests. Nonetheless, where Campbell’s 
ground breaking research on the BHA set humanism 
as a central focus in the study of nonreligion, Longden 
continues to break ground by providing an informa-
tive longitudinal perspective that maintains this focus. 
Secularization Resurrected? A Projection of 
Growth 
Despite claims that there is a religious revival wait-
ing just around the corner and that the tenets of sec-
ularization raised mid 20th century may have been 
premature (e.g. Berger, 1996; Stark, 2015), trends to-
wards declining levels of religious affiliation and the 
reality of a secular world persist (Bruce, 2002, 2014). 
Although secularization is variously conceived of not 
only by theorists (c.f. Chaves, 1994), but also with-
in cultures, for example Turkey (Sevinc, Hood, and 
Coleman, Forthcoming), current estimates place the 
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number of nonreligious in the world at 26% excluding 
China and 44% including China (Keysar, Forthcom-
ing). In the United States, between 2007 and 2014, 
individuals who self describe as “Christian” has seen 
an almost 8% decline (currently residing at 70.6%), 
while atheist, agnostic, and “nothing in particular” has 
increased over 6% to reach 22.8% of the population 
(Pew Research Center’s Religion & Public Life Pro-
ject, 2015). Clearly growth has occurred in nonreli-
gious self-identification, but will it continue? 
In their research note “Simple Markov Model for Es-
timating the Growth of Nonreligion in the United 
States,” Stinespring and Cragun present a data driven 
model predicting a large increase in secular identity. 
Using data from the General Social Survey between 
1973 and 2012, using a market share approach to reli-
gious and nonreligious identity, they forecast between 
26% and 47% of the US population will be nonreli-
gious by the year 2042. However, could forces other 
than secularization be driving these trends? Unlikely, 
as Stinespring and Cragun suggest (100): 
If the rise of the nones was solely due to the 
decline of a single religion due to a particular 
crisis or controversy, our model would need to 
reflect that fact. But the rise of the nonreligious 
over the last three decades cannot be attributed 
to a single controversy or crisis but rather to a 
broad level trend – secularization (Bruce, 2002; 
2014; Cragun and Lawson, 2010; Sherkat, 2014).
While valuable from a purely sociological perspective, 
their secularization model also has implications for so-
cio-cultural evolution (Stuart-Fox, 2015). Here, their 
predictions might entail a significant shift in worldview 
is on the horizon and as religious representations in the 
mind fail to initiate the self-perpetuating religious be-
havior they once did, they may be abandoned in favor 
of new nonreligious worldviews, whatever they may be. 
The Secularity of Academics 
The long history of atheism, variously defined, has 
appeared to reside predominantly, but not exclusively, 
amongst societies more educated individuals – scien-
tists, teachers, philosophers, and so on and so forth. 
There are many reasons behind this trend, of course, 
but from a psychological perspective, some key factors 
may pertain to cognitive style (Morgan, 2014), such 
as tendencies toward analytic thinking (Gervais and 
Norenzayan, 2012) and systemizing (Caldwell-Har-
ris and Jordan, 2014). Whereas these tendencies have 
been found in quantitative psychological approaches 
to date (c.f., Beit-Hallahmi, 2015; Caldwell-Harris, 
2012), their appearance can also be seen in individu-
al case studies (Coleman, Silver, and Hood, in press; 
Coleman et al., in press). However, cognitive styles 
can only account for so much when explaining the 
high number of academics who are secular. Other fac-
tors surely contribute. 
In his article “Explaining the Secularity of Academ-
ics: Historical Questions and Psychological Findings,” 
Beit-Hallahmi draws attention to not only the mind 
of academics, but also the historical contexts and the 
structural differences of academia and religion, which 
can contribute to what Leuba (1934) proclaimed as 
the “eminence effect.” The eminence effect being, that 
the leading scientists and scholars in any given field 
are typically also the least religious. In his summari-
zation of a vast amount of scholarly literature bearing 
on the secularity of academics in comparison with the 
more religious, Beit-Hallahmi (115) concludes: 
There is a huge gap between the openness of 
science in principle, and the reality which de-
prives individuals from highly religious families 
of the opportunity to study it. This is a form of 
deprivation, but those families follow other ide-
als, and things are not likely to change. The re-
ligious composition of academics worldwide is 
a significant bit of data, and tells us something 
about the modern age, when anti-authoritari-
anism and skepticism are handsomely (or less 
than that) rewarded.
While having a PhD is certainly no guarantee of athe-
ism or secularity, a strong relationship between them 
exists. Even the ancient Greek philosopher Xeno-
phanes, while a classical theist by today’s standards, 
shunned the popular religious understandings of the 
Homeric gods of his day and believed in a radical-
ly different god than those of his fellow countrymen 
(Feyerabend, 1999). Thus, although many academi-
cians are fairly secular, if not atheist, even those who 
are “religious” likely differ markedly from laybelievers. 
Why is this the case? Beit-Hallahmi’s theorization 
offers up several possible reasons. 
Imagining God or Implicitly Believing? 
What happens when a nonbeliever is prompted to 
imagine a god? This is an important questioned posed 
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by Bradley, Exline, and Uzdavines’s study (120-130), 
which will be introduced shortly, however it is a ques-
tion nested in the nuances of what it means or does 
not mean, to have a representation or image in the 
mind. In many respects, this is a question that should 
be at the heart all research on belief or nonbelief in 
God ( Jong, 2013), and as such, we wish to introduce 
the study by Bradley and colleagues, by first drawing 
attention to this critical question. 
Can something individuals do not believe in or believe 
is not “real” carry psychological weight, affect cogni-
tion and possibly behavior, and so forth? Of course! 
For example, Rozin, Millman, and Nemeroff (1986) 
demonstrated that people refuse to eat fudge that is 
shaped like dog feces and are more hesitant to throw 
darts at pictures of favorable individuals. In these cas-
es, the individuals certainly do not believe that the deli-
cious fudge really is dog excrement or that a loved one 
really is going to be injured if they lob a dart at their 
picture. Additionally, and in elucidating the point that 
even entities or events that are not real, or for that 
matter not believed to be real, can cause affective and 
behavioral responses, the underlying mechanisms re-
sponsible for these reactions, be it pure association, 
disgust, contagion or something yet to be determined, 
is not the issue. What is the issue is that one does not 
have to believe in something in order to be affected by 
the mental representation of that something, whatev-
er it may be (Albahari, 2013; Gendler, 2008). As such, 
studies suggesting that even some atheists have the 
potential to become emotionally aroused when daring 
God to do bad things are not as provocative as they 
might appear at first glance (e.g., Linderman, Hey-
wood, Riekki, and Makkonen, 2014). 
Another provocative comparison that has been used 
in the psychology of religion specifically is the com-
parison of measuring “Who is a racist?” with “Who 
is a believer?” (e.g., Barrett, 2012). On one hand, it 
is obvious that, in many cases a person who is rac-
ist might not own up to this belief. But on the other 
hand as the example above demonstrated, one can be 
disposed to emotions or behavior by representations 
that are not believed in, or that are not “real” simply 
in virtue of having said information in one’s cognitive 
repertoire. (For example, it would make little sense to 
say that a man shouting at his T.V. for the quarter-
back to “pass the ball already” implicitly believes or 
even imagines that this football player can hear him 
[Gendler, 2008].) However, psychologists have de-
veloped ways of measuring “beliefs” that may not be 
explicitly stated, using implicit measures (e.g., Jong, 
2013; Jong, Halberstadt, and Bleumke, 2012). The is-
sue here is relational and involves assumptions about 
representations in the mind that one is aware of and/
or endorses, versus others that may not be consciously 
accessible and/or endorsed (Gervais et al., 2011). As 
Barrett, (2012, 201) suggests:
Often measuring who is and is not a supernatu-
ralist in the cognitive sense is a little like trying 
to measure who is a racist – some people will 
deny it, but their behaviors tell a different story. 
Further, studies have demonstrated that even when 
Whites are primed with a black faces, as opposed to 
white faces, this automatically increases the response 
time needed to identify a gun and when in a speeded 
condition, individuals automatically misidentify com-
mon tools as guns (Payne, 2001). However, none of 
this is even partial guarantee of the individual actually 
being a racist. Contra Barrett (2012), behaviors that 
can be elicited in a laboratory or other sitting, do not 
necessarily imply an individual is a racist or that they 
are “implicitly racist,” only that conceptual content in 
the mind may have become activated and that associ-
ations between the measured variables exist, however 
the reasons for these associations are opaque and po-
tentially numerous (Albahari, 2013; Fazio and Olson, 
2003; Gendler, 2008). Thus, while Barrett (2012) uses 
the case of racism as analogy to imply that, perhaps, 
many nonbelievers are “implicitly believers,” this can 
be misleading. 
For example, in Fazio and Olson’s (2003) review of 
implicit measures commonly used in social cognition 
research, they have suggested that one limitation of 
implicit association tests (IAT) is its inability to sep-
arate individual knowledge from cultural knowledge. 
Here, responding in a particular fashion on an IAT 
might not actually reflect personally held attitudes, 
but simply culturally available information. Informa-
tion, such that, even a particular individual who deeply 
avows not endorsing belief X may respond “as if ” they 
do, due to having associations in their mind that link 
the endorsement of belief X by other individuals in 
their culture to the target stimuli in question. Implicit 
associations can certainly be tested with the implicit 
association test, but whether or not these get to count 
for “beliefs” is an open question ( Jong,  2013). 
Similarly, and elsewhere in studies pertaining to non-
believers, it has become common fare to tout a “divided 
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mind” to atheists (e.g., Järnefelt, Canfield, and Kele-
man, 2015) and build on the often discordant nature 
of an endorsed belief when compared to an “implicit” 
or speeded response (e.g., Jong, Halberstadt, and Blue-
mke, 2012; Heywood and Bering, 2014; Linderman, 
Heywood, Riekki, and Makkonen, 2014). Depending 
on what it means to have a specific representation in 
the mind, why it may be there, and how it is accessed 
has yet to be adequately addressed in CSR or the psy-
chology of religion (Gervais et al., 2011; Jong, 2013). 
If nonbelievers may be “implicitly religious,” and if 
this is taken serve as meaningful ontological ground 
for discussion, then we suggest drawing attention the 
fact that most religious individuals implicitly believe 
– perhaps really believe – despite their explicit ora-
tions, in an average god of average human strength 
and an IQ score of around 100 ( Jong, Kavanagh, and 
Visala, 2015; for review, see Heiphetz, Lane, Waytz, 
and Young, 2015). Importantly, we wish to bring this 
occurrence to conscious awareness not in an accusato-
ry attempt to suggest any of the aforementioned re-
search is somehow biased, but only to reinforce Jong’s 
(2013, 76) call to seriously and critically consider what 
it means to have a belief as “those of us who are com-
mitted to the study of religion [and nonbelief ] – have 
to join in this discussion4.” While there are conceptual 
conundrums involved in answering this question, it 
is a question that also elicits great empirical concern. 
Throughout history, God has been conceived of as the 
cause or impetus of every phenomenon imaginable, 
from the occurrence of life itself (Shook, 2010), to even 
more mundane aspects of life, such as what book to 
read or what clothes to wear (Luhrmann, 2012). While 
a representation of God may certainly affect believers, 
can a hypothetical god affect nonbelievers? Moreover, 
is it even feasible to probe nonbelievers for a “god im-
age,” something they do not believe in and may not 
exist? Furthermore, if they are able to imagine a god, is 
this a cold, evil, tyrant deity ready to banish the atheist 
to Hell? Or, perhaps a more loving god, someone hard-
ly concerned with the spread of fire and brimstone? 
The God of Nonbelievers: Characteristics of a Hypo-
thetical God
These questions have answers and Bradley, Exline and 
Uzdavines’s study, titled “The God of Nonbelievers: 
Characteristics of a Hypothetical God” provide ini-
tial data. Drawing on their sample of 393 atheists, the 
authors report the imagined characteristics of a god 
in relation to the individual’s personality traits, using 
the Big Five, adult attachment, as well as level of pri-
ori religious and nonreligious participation and desire 
to believe a god exists. Bradley, Exline and Uzdavines 
(127) conclude: 
…that nonbelievers who think about god in 
terms of prior personal belief think of a more 
loving god, rather than being filled with anger, 
hatred, or other negative emotions toward god. 
On the other hand, nonbelievers who think 
about god in terms of popular teachings about 
god see god as a cruel being.
Bradley and colleagues study suggests that for those 
nonbelievers who are capable of, or who choose to, im-
agine a hypothetical god, their imagined or prior con-
ceptions of this deity may be influenced by the context 
in which the representation was learned. As prior the-
orization and studies have suggested, context matters 
(for review see, Gervais et al., 2011 [Henrich, 2009; 
Lanman, 2012,  2013; Willard, 2015]). In closing, we 
offer appreciation for the authors careful attention to 
the nuanced question discussed in our introduction 
about belief and representation. Here, Bradley, Exline 
and Uzdavines’s study has taken care to avoid con-
fusing the capability to hold a god image in the mind 
with actually believing in this representation or im-
plying this is what atheists may “implicitly” believe. 
Exiting the Ark: Rabbinical Deconversion
Anyone who has ever read a good book knows they 
can be hard to put down once you start reading. Good 
books can captivate us; they pull us in with their rich 
narrative and evoked imagery – a good book can have 
lasting effects. Like wise, “The Good Book”—that 
is, the Bible—is even harder to put down, especially 
when one’s sole source of income is preaching from it. 
For many clergy, who may know of no other trade, no 
other way to make a living, no other way to support 
themselves, their spouse, kids and dog, it can be espe-
cially hard to put down – even long after they stopped 
believing. Furthermore, their position as a religious 
official may lie at the heart of their social life, consti-
tuting the majority of one’s friends and acquaintances. 
Leaving behind your religion can be like socio-eco-
nomic suicide. Recent research from Dennett and 
LaScola (2013/2015), published in their book Caught 
in the Pulpit, details such struggles, both internal and 
external, for these former persons of faith as the world 
they reside in has become but a mere facade. Indeed, 
the past 15 years has seen further psychological and 
sociological research accrue exploring the complex-
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ities of deconversion (e.g., Fazzino, 2014; Franken-
thaler, 2015; Keller, Klein, Hood, and Streib, 2013; 
Streib et al., 2009; Paloutzian, Murken, Streib, and 
Rößler-Namini, 2013). However, if some Christian 
pastors are caught in the pulpit and trying to leave, 
then Jewish Rabbis’ must escape the Ark. 
When Rabbis Lose Faith: Twelve rabbis tell their sto-
ries about their loss of belief in God
In his research article, titled “When Rabbis Lose 
Faith: Twelve rabbis tell their stories about their loss 
of belief in God,” Shrell-Fox analyzes deconversion 
narratives from 12 Rabbis’ in Israel. Whereas Judaism 
typically emphasizes “deed over creed” when com-
pared to Christianity, he discovered that several of the 
Rabbis’ actually showed little existential angst as non-
believers in religious leadership roles. In many cases, 
they have reframed ritual practice and instead, focus 
on social solidarity (i.e., belonging, Keysar, 2014) or 
shift prayer focus away from God and towards secular 
philosophical insight. However, an open eye during 
prayer time may still be able to uncover the unfaithful. 
As Shrell-Fox (141) suggests: 
Joseph, whose story reflects the combination of 
two rabbis’ stories, would say that those con-
gregants who are acute observers of human be-
havior will be able to tell that he is not praying. 
There are certain motions a praying Jew makes. 
He does not make them. There are certain times 
when one is expected to mouth words, or say 
them aloud; he does not.
With secularization trending into the future, decon-
versions will continue. However, for those whose live-
lihood revolves around the financial and social success 
of religious institutions, exiting this so-called “form 
of life” (Wittgenstein, 1953) may be much harder en-
deavor. But, the evidence is clear; we needn’t confuse 
all pastoral and rabbinical leaders as “believers.” A 
“big question” remains; just how many atheist cler-
gy are there? While the popular quip of “no atheists 
in foxholes” may be amusing, the research of Shrell-
Fox and his contemporaries assures us that at the very 
least there are atheists in the pulpit—and the Ark. 
Book Reviews 
The reviewing of academic books constitutes an ex-
tremely important service to the scientific and schol-
arly endeavor. While most books (hopefully all) are 
typically reviewed prepublication by anywhere from 
only one, to even three or more experts in a given field, 
the vast amount of scholarship that has been pub-
lished in the history of the human quest for knowl-
edge and the many incommensurable interpretations 
of this literature far exceeds the capabilities of even 
the top intellectuals to critique and parse apart its 
many invaluable nuances. Thus, book reviews contrib-
ute significantly, although often underappreciated, to 
our present corpus of knowledge and with its contin-
ued growth, there importance can only increase. 
In her review of Trent Dougherty’s (2014) book, The 
Problem of Animal Pain: A Theodicy for All Creatures 
Great and Small, Goodnick offers both praise and cri-
tique for Dougherty’s attempt to construct a reprieve 
for, as he sees it, the necessary suffering of animals 
under a just God (which are later reincarnated in a C. 
S. Lewis/Narnian fashion). However, while Goodnick 
(152) suggests “Dougherty has presented a successful 
defense against the problem of animal pain,” she is 
“not convinced by it as a theodicy.”
In his review of Bradley and Tate’s (2010) book, The 
New Atheist Novel: Fiction, Philosophy and Polemic after 
9/11, Mann details how these authors have dissected 
four popular books of literary fiction (by Ian McEwan, 
Martin Amis, Philip Pullman, and Salman Rushdie), 
which subtly intertwine and introduce “New Atheist 
philosophies” into their contemporary fiction. While 
Mann suggests Bradley and Tate (2010) may chide 
these authors for “rejecting a certain mode of tran-
scendence while championing another,” he finds their 
book is “more an exercise in relativism than anything 
else” (154). New atheist novels continue a long tradi-
tion of the interface between religion and novels. For 
example, Dawn Coleman (2013) masterfully docu-
ments the suspicion of previous generations of preach-
ers, of the seductive power of novels to challenge the 
pious. She not only documents how eighteenth centu-
ry preachers compared the emerging American novel 
to junk food and alcohol, recommending temperance 
at best, and abstinence as most desirable. But, she also 
notes how the cannon of the seemingly American 
secular novel incorporated preaching into their nar-
ratives indicating that the new atheism intertwine in 
contemporary fiction continues a tradition that blurs 
any firm distinction as to what is secular and what is 
religious. 
In her review of Zuckerman’s (2014) book, Living 
the Secular Life: New Answers to Old Questions, Schutz 
(page) delivers a chapter-by-chapter overview of pre-
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cisely how this secular life might be lived, noting this 
“is no small task”. While she suggests Zuckerman’s 
book is clearly meant for a popular audience, its nar-
rative is driven by his extensive scholarship. In the 
end, Schutz (156) finds the book both “engaging” and 
“relatable,” the type of book one shares “with their re-
ligious friends and family and say[s], “This is me. If 
you want to understand, read.” 
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Endnotes
[1] This example is borrowed (and cited in full) from 
Cragun, Hammer, and Nielsen’s article.
[2] http://chattfreethought.com/ 
[3] https://www.facebook.com/HumanistAssembly
[4] Furthermore, we certainly acknowledge the long 
history of discordant novelty that makes so much of 
social psychology research interesting to humans in 
general and nonscientists in particular, however ad-
dressing how researchers frame their studies is an is-
sue for future articles.
